报告题目：竞争环境下，非营利组织的价格与质量决策
报告时间：2024年9月19日 10:00-11:30
会议地点：必发9988集团B220
报告人：王鹏 讲师
举办人：边博旻 副教授
报告内容和摘要：
Nonprofit organizations have grown increasingly critical in many markets. This paper presents a theoretical model of nonprofit quality and price decisions. The traditional Arrow-Hansmann paradigm prescribes that the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers drives nonprofits to provide higher quality than for-profits. Yet, the extent of information asymmetry has significantly reduced in many markets due to regulatory information disclosure and the explosive growth of user reviews. In seeking a theoretical alternative that does not rely on the assumption of information asymmetry, our model focuses on the strategic behavior of nonprofit organizations. We show that, with openly available quality information in the marketplace, nonprofits can still choose higher quality than for-profits when quality functions as a strategic tool to attract customers. Moreover, we find that the price comparisons between nonprofits and for-profits are not always consistent with the quality outcomes. Furthermore, we demonstrate the nuanced impacts of consumer heterogeneity in quality preference. While contributing to the economic theories on nonprofit organizations, this study demonstrates how marketing decisions could be fruitfully utilized by nonprofits and what implications this could generate for competition.
报告人简介：
王鹏，天津大学管理与经济学部市场营销系讲师。于南开大学取得本科和硕士学位，于美国亚利桑那大学取得博士学位。研究领域为营销模型、创新创业、娱乐产业营销、平台战略等。他的理论和实证研究成果发表在International Journal of Research in Marketing (IJRM)、IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management等国际期刊，并曾担任Journal of Retailing、Journal of Management Science and Engineering等期刊的匿名审稿人。
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